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APPLICATION OF NOERR-PENNINGTON AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO
POLITICALLY MOTIVATED ECONOMIC
BOYCOTTS: MISSOURI V NOW
By Charles P. Cockerill*
I. INTRODUCTION

Boycotts' or concerted refusals to deal historically have been held
to be combinations that restrain trade in violation of section one of the
Sherman Act.2 Courts have predicated antitrust liability, not on the
quantum of impact on interstate trade or the reasonableness of the
methods used by the combination but, rather, on the fact that the compurpose of effecting a
bination was formed with the express or implied
3
competition.
or
trade
of
restraint
in
boycott
* J.D., 1979 (California Western School of Law); B.A., 1972 (University of California);
Member, State Bar of California.
1. Boycott is defined as "a method of pressuring a party with whom one has a dispute
by withholding, or enlisting others to withhold, patronage or services from the target." St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 541 (1978).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) provides that "[elvery contract, combination in the form of trust
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal." Despite the expansive wording of the
Sherman Act, it has long been settled that not every form of combination in restraint of
trade falls within its scope. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59-60 (1911).
3. See, e.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (group
boycott); Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (group boycott); Eastern States Lumber Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914) (group boycott).
Per se violations of the Sherman Act "are certain agreements or practices which because of
their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming, virtue are conclusively
presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use." North Pac. Ry. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (a tying arrangement is per se unreasonable and unlawful under
the Sherman Act).
Contrasted with the per se rule is the so-called rule of reason approach, which is the
prevailing standard of analysis for liability under § 1-of the Sherman Act. Continental T.V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 46-59 (1977) (the rule of reason is the appropriate
standard for vertical restraints in the manufacturing process). Justice Brandeis articulated
the rule of reason in Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918):
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates
and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or
even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily
consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its
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In 1961 the Supreme Court found a significant implied exemption

from liability under the Sherman Act for combinations seeking governmental action.4 This "political activities" exemption was first formulated in Eastern RailroadPresidentsConference v. Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc.5 The exemption was based on the rationale that although purpose
and intent may be relevant in analyzing antitrust liability, "no violation
of the [Sherman] Act can be predicated upon mere attempts to influence the passage or enforcement of laws." 6

In 1978, the Noerr political activities exemption was applied to the
advocation of boycotts by the National Organization for Women
(NOW). Because the State of Missouri had failed to ratify the Equal

Rights Amendment, NOW was urging that conventions in that state be
boycotted. When several conventions were cancelled, the state brought

a parens patriae action in the federal district court for Western Miseffect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the
reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a good intention will save an
otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent
may help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.
In a recent decision, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stated that under the
rule of reason
a court will be required to analyze "the facts peculiar to the business, the history of
the restraint, and the reasons why it was imposed." If, on analysis, the restraint is
found to have legitimate business purposes whose realization serves to promote
competition, the "anticompetitive evils" of the challenged practice must be carefully balanced against its "procompetitive virtues" to ascertain whether the former
outweigh the latter. A restraint is unreasonable if it has the "net effect" of substantially impeding competition.
Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (quoting National Soc'y of
Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978)).
4. A second implied exemption from the Sherman Act exists for state action. Parker v.
Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) (Sherman Act held inapplicable to California's regulation of
raisin production). In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 415
(1978), the Court refused to grant municipalities automatic immunity under the Parkerdoctrine and thus limited the implied state action exemption to situations in which the challenged activity was within the contemplation of the legislature. See Comment, The Airport
CarRental Concessions: The Role of City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power and Light Co. in
Restricting Threats to Free Competition, 14 CAL. W.L. REV. 325 (1978).
5. 365 U.S. 127, 136-38 (1961). In addition to exempting conduct that seeks to influence legislative action, succeeding decisions extended antitrust immunity to attempts to influence executive, UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965), and adjudicative governmental
bodies as well, California Motor Transp. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
6. 365 U.S. at 137-38. "[E]ven though the sole purpose in seeking to influence the
passage and enforcement of laws was to destroy the truckers as competitors for the long
distance freight business," id. at 138, "[t]o hold that . . . people cannot freely inform the
government of their wishes would impute to the Sherman Act a purpose to regulate, not
business activity, but political activity, a purpose which would have no basis in the legislative history of the Act." Id. at 137.
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souri for injunctive relief.7 Missouri alleged that NOW was engaging
in a combination in restraint of trade in violation of section one of the
Sherman Act. NOW responded, and the district court agreed, that the
antitrust laws were inapplicable to NOW's convention boycott campaign due to its noncommercial nature.8 NOW also argued that its
conduct fell within the political activities exemption to the Sherman
Act and was protected by the first amendment. The Eight Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision on this basis.
This article discusses the general proscription of the antitrust laws
against boycotts in restraint of trade and focuses on the 1979 decision
of Missouri v. NOW.9 That decision, upheld on appeal, clarifies the
scope of the political activities exemption and the protection afforded
by the first amendment for conduct that, while causing severe economic
injury, is clearly political.
II.

SHERMAN ACT: PROSCRIPTION AGAINST

BOYCOTTS

IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE

The broad scope of liability under the Sherman Act was defined in
1911 in the landmark case of StandardOil Co. v. United States,"0 and
its companion case of United States v. American Tobacco Co. " In
American Tobacco Co., the Court interpreted section one to prohibit
conduct that "operated to the prejudice of the public interests by unduly restricting competition or unduly obstructing the due course of
trade."' 2 The purpose of the Sherman Act is to proscribe all conduct
that interferes with the natural flow of interstate commerce.' 3 This expansive scope of antitrust liability for boycotts or concerted refusals to
deal has been refined by several Supreme Court decisions.
In 1914, the Court in Eastern States Lumber Ass'n v. United
7. Missouri v. NOW, 467 F. Supp. 289 (W.D. Mo. 1979), affid, No. 79-1379 (8th Cir.
Mar. 28, 1980).
8. "The Supreme Court's reasons for nonapplication of the antitrust laws in Noerr apply with greater weight to this case, which 'involves political opponents, not commercial
competitors; and political objectives, not market place goals."' Id. at 305 (quoting Council
for Employment & Economic Energy Use v. WHDH Corp., 580 F.2d 9, 12 (1st Cir. 1978),

cert. denied, 440 U.S. 945 (1979)).
9. 467 F. Supp. 289 (W.D. Mo. 1979), aft'd, No. 79-1379 (8th Cir. Mar. 28, 1980).
10. 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (Standard Oil Co. and its subsidiary companies were held to have
formed a combination in violation of the Sherman Act).
11. 221 U.S. 106 (1911) (an attempt by American Tobacco Co. and several accessory
corporations and subsidiary companies to dominate interstate commerce in the tobacco industry held to be a combination in restraint of trade and, thus, an antitrust violation).
12. Id. at 179.
13. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. at 58-62.
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States'4 upheld the section one liability of certain retail lumber dealers
for conspiring to boycott lumber wholesalers who were also selling at
retail. The retail lumber dealers believed that such direct sales to the
public by wholesalers was too great a competitive threat to their market
to be tolerated. The various lumber associations representing the retail
dealers distributed to their members an official report that listed those
wholesale dealers who sold directly to consumers. Although there existed no agreement among the retailers to boycott the listed wholesalers, the Court stated that "the purpose in the predetermined and
periodical circulation of this report [was] to put the ban upon wholesale
dealers whose names appear[ed] in the list of unfair dealers."' 5 The
combination in Eastern States Lumber was found to restrain trade unduly because the retailing wholesalers were blacklisted by the retail
lumber associations and retailers were implicitly instructed not to
purchase from them.
A similar anticompetitive practice was struck down in Fashion
Originators'GuildofAmerica, Inc. v. FTC. 6 The Fashion Originators'

Guild of America (FOGA) was comprised of designers and manufacturers of women's clothing and fashion textiles. Members of FOGA
entered into agreements to boycott and refuse to sell to retailers who
sold garments copied by non-member manufacturers from exclusive
designs put out by FOGA members. It was held that the combination,
which induced approximately twelve thousand retailers throughout the
country to comply with FOGA's boycott program, constituted an unfair method of competition. 17 The effect of the combination was to vest
enough power and control in FOGA to exclude from the industry those
manufacturers and distributors who failed to conform to 8FOGA's rules
and regulations and thus tended to create a monopoly.'
A third instance in which a group boycott was found to violate the
antitrust laws was in Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc. '9

Klor's, an appliance store, competed with Broadway-Hale, a neighboring department store that also sold household appliances. BroadwayHale was found to be liable for entering into agreements whereby appliance manufacturers and their distributors either refused to sell or
sold only on unfavorable terms to Klor's. The effect of the concerted
refusal to deal was-that Klor's lost its "freedom to buy appliances in an
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

234 U.S. 600 (1914).
Id. at 608-09.
312 U.S. 457 (1941).
Id. at 463-64.
Id. at 466-67.
359 U.S. 207 (1959).
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open competitive market."2
21
The common thread running through these leading boycott cases
is the intent, express or implied, to impair or destroy competition in a
commercial setting. The per se rule developed in these cases is applied
when there exists a combination to boycott or refuse to deal that restrains trade, monopolizes, or lessens competition. An important factor
in these and other group boycott cases in which antitrust liability has
been imposed is that economic benefit can be traced to the principals,
while economic detriment is suffered by the target of the boycott.

III.
A.

THE NOERR-PENNNGTON DOCTRINE

22

Noerr's PoliticalActivities Exemption

In EasternRailroadPresidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,

Inc.,21 a group of trucking companies brought an action against several
railroads and a public relations firm for violations of the Sherman Act.
The truckers' complaint charged the defendant railroads with conducting a deceptive publicity campaign against the trucking industry to
encourage the "adoption and retention of laws and law enforcement
practices destructive of the trucking business . . .and to impair the
relationship existing between the truckers and their customers."' 4 The
railroads readily admitted that they had mounted a publicity campaign
to influence the passage of state legislation covering truck weight limits
and tax rates. Such a campaign, the railroads argued, was simply
outside the reach of the Sherman Act.
20. Id. at 213.
21. See also United States v. General Motors, 384 U.S. 127 (1966) (General Motors'
collaborative action with dealers and associations was a per se violation of the antitrust
laws).
22. See generally Costilo, Scope of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 34 ANTITRUST L.J.
141 (1967); Fischel, Antitrust Liabilityfor Attempts To Influence Government Action.: The
Basis and Limits of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 45 U. CHI. L. Rav. 80, 105 (1977);
Holzer, An Analysisfor Reconciling the Antitrust Laws with the Right To Petition: NoerrPennington in Light of Cantor v. Detroit Edison, 27 EMORY L.J. 673 (1978); Note, NoerrPennington-Hole in the Umbrella, 24 BAYLOR L. REv.265 (1972); Note, Antitrust-NoerrPennington Doctrine-MetroCable Co. v. CATV of Rockford, Inc., 17 B.C. INDUS. & COM.
L. REv. 511 (1976); Comment, Antitrust Immunity: Recent Exceptionsto Noerr-Penmington
Defense, 12 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 1333 (1971); Note, Antitrust-Supreme Court
Extends Noerr Immunityfrom Sherman Act to Attempts To Influence Adjudication,76 DICK.
L. REv. 593 (1972); Comment, Solicitation of Government Action in Restraint of TradeNoerr Revisited, 8 Hous. L. REv.952 (1971); 48 Miss. L.J. 634 (1977); 22 SYRACUSE L. Rv.
1151 (1971); 30 VAND. L. REv.75 (1977).
23. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
24. Id. at 129.
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The district court held,2 5 and the Third Circuit affirmed, 26 that the
railroads' publicity campaign violated the Sherman Act. The Supreme
Court, in a unanimous decision, reversed, holding in part that "a publicity campaign to influence governmental action falls clearly into the
category of political activity,"'2 7 which is beyond the scope of conduct
proscribed by the Sherman Act. Writing for the Court, Mr. Justice
Black began his analysis with the simple statement "that no violation of
the [Sherman] Act can be predicated upon mere attempts to influence
the passage or enforcement of laws." 2 When the trade restraint flows
from valid governmental action, and not simply from private activities,
no antitrust liability can be imposed. 29 Because no antitrust liability
could be imposed for the passage or enforcement of laws, it was axiomatic for the Court to conclude that the Sherman Act likewise "does
not prohibit two or more persons from associating together in an at-tempt to persuade the legislature or the executive to take particular action with respect to a law that would produce a restraint or a
monopoly."30
The Court in Noerr stressed that the essential dissimilarity between combinations seeking passage of legislation or enforcement of
laws and those seeking to impair trade or destroy competition constitutes "a warning against treating the defendants' conduct as though it
amounted to a common-law trade restraint."'" To hold that the Sherman Act forbids combinations that intend to influence the passage or
enforcement of laws would ignore the fact that the purpose of the Sherman Act is to regulate the business activity, not the political activity, of
individuals and corporations within the United States.32
In addition to this essential dissimilarity, the Court rested its deci25. 155 F. Supp. 768 (E.D. Pa. 1957). The district court was careful to explain that it
was not "illegal for an industry to seek any and every proper legislative goal." Id. at 816.
26. 273 F.2d 218 (3rd Cir. 1959) (per curiam).
27. 365 U.S. at 140-41.
28. Id. at 135. In Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 601 (1976), the Court
commented on the scope of the holding in Noerr, stating that "[t]he case did not involve any
question of either liability or exemption for private action taken in compliance with state
law."
29. 365 U.S. at 136 (citing United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., 307 U.S. 533 (1939) and
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943)).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 137. The Court stated that "the question is conclusively settled, against the
application of the Act, when this factor of essential dissimilarity is considered along with the
other difficulties that would be presented by a holding that the Sherman Act forbids associations for the purpose of influencing or enforcement of laws." Id. at 136-37.
32. Id. See also Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. at 466-
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sion on a consideration of two other factors. First, because a representative form of government relies on being informed by the citizens of
their various needs and grievances, any statutory liability for such communication is totally outside the contemplation of the Sherman Act.
Surely the prospect of prosecution for such activity would chill the free
interchange of ideas between the governed and the governing. 33 Second, serious constitutional questions are raised by construing the Sherman Act as regulating political activity. 34 From the Bill of Rights,
Justice Black singled out the right to petition the government and suggested that the Court could not "lightly impute to Congress an intent to
invade these freedoms. 3 5
After concluding that the railroads could not be liable for the
"mere solicitation of governmental action with respect to the passage
and enforcement of laws,"' 36 the Court looked at several other factors
upon which the lower courts had based their holdings that the railroads' publicity campaign violated the Sherman Act. First considered
was the railroads' anticompetitive purpose-their alleged intent to destroy the truckers as competitors in the long-haul freight business. The
Court found that it was not illegal for persons to seek legislation that is
more advantageous to them than to their competitors. In fact, such an
ulterior motive, or anticompetitive purpose, is legally irrelevant when
the objective is the passage or enforcement of certain laws.3 7 Second,
the Court looked at the railroads' attempt to give their propaganda the
appearance of being spontaneous declarations from independent
groups. The Court held that use of the so-called third party technique
in a publicity campaign designed to influence governmental action does
not violate the Sherman Act38 and is thus also legally irrelevant.3 9
B.

Scope of Noerr Expandedin Pennington

In 1965, the Supreme Court decided UMW v. Pennington.40 The
decision re-emphasized the holding in Noerr and clarified the scope of
the Noerr political activities exemption. In Pennington it was alleged
that a group of coal companies and the UMW had conspired to drive
small coal companies out of business by lobbying before the Secretary
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. at 137.
Id. at 138.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 138-40.
Id. at 140.
Id. at 142.
381 U.S. 657 (1965).
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of Labor for adjustment to the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) wage
and purchasing policies.
One of the issues in Pennington was whether the trial court's instructions to the jury were in error. The jury was instructed that the
UMW's lobbying efforts were legal "'unless the parties so urged the
TVA to modify its policies in buying coal for the purpose of driving the
small operators out of business.' "41 Mr. Justice White, writing for the
Court, held such instruction to constitute reversible error 42 because the
jury was permitted to find liability if it determined that the requisite
anticompetitive purpose was present. Such a finding of liability from
intent was simply impermissible under Noerr. In holding that such
lobbying before the Secretary of Labor was not actionable, the Court
stated,
Noerr shields from the Sherman Act a concerted effort to influence public officials regardless of intent or purpose ....
Joint efforts to influence public officials do not violate the antitrust laws even though intended to eliminate competition.
Such conduct is not illegal, either standing alone or as part of
a broader scheme itself a violation of the Sherman Act.43
Pennington expands the scope of Noerr by using the term "public
officials."'
When read together, Noerr and Pennington hold that
"joint efforts to influence government action are outside the scope of
the Sherman Act, even if the combination is formed for the sole purpose of eliminating competitors."45
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine was given its broadest application
in UnitedStates v. Johns-Manville Corp.46 In that case, the defendants
wanted "to increase the cost of selling foreign-made

. . .

pipe in the

United States or to exclude such pipe entirely. ' 47 The concerted activities of the defendants to influence the decision of public procurement
officials on pipe specifications were held to be constitutionally protected and could not "be the basis of a finding of violation of the antitrust laws, .

.

. regardless of the intent with which they were

41. Id. at 670 (quoting jury instruction delivered by trial court).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See Mark Aero, Inc. v. TWA, Inc., 580 F.2d 288, 294-95 (8th Cir. 1978), in which the
court stated that "[t]he use of the term public official" by the Supreme Court in Pennington
"clearly expanded the Noerr decision, which had referred only to legislative or executive
action."
45. Id. (citing with approval Note, Trade Regulation: Noerr Antitrust Immunitl--Defin.
ing the Sham Exception, 29 OKLA. L. REV.512, 514 (1976)).
46. 259 F. Supp. 440 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
47. Id. at 452.
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undertaken."48 Thus, the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine was "expanded to
protect joint efforts to influence governmental actions as a purchaser in
the market, not merely when acting in a sovereign legislative or regulatory capacity."4 9 Subsequent to the 1966 decision in Johns-Manville,
courts applying the rules and policies of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine

have substantially narrowed the doctrine's applicability.50
C

Sham Exception to the Noerr-Pennington Political
Activities Exemption

The Supreme Court in Noerr alluded to a limit to immunity under

the political activities exemption when it stated that there may exist
circumstances in which the alleged combination "is a mere sham to

cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor and the applica-

tion of the Sherman Act would be justified."'" From 1961 to 1972,
however, the Supreme Court failed to clarify this "sham exception" to
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.

The Court first applied the sham exception in Caifornia Motor
Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited.5" Certain highway carriers had

used a trust fund to finance opposition to all applications filed by competing highway carriers with the Public Utilities Commission or the
Interstate Commerce Commission.5 3 Justice Douglas, writing for the
48. Id. at 452-53 (citations omitted).
49. Israel v. Baxter Labs., Inc., 466 F.2d 272, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
50. Id. See, e.g., California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508
(1972) (discussed in text accompanying notes 52-63 infra); Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444
F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972) (action by football franchise
owners to attack a restrictive covenant in a public stadium lease that permitted only one
team to have access to the stadium); Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co.
of America, 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,404 U.S. 1047 (1972) (owners of land
in a natural gas field brought action against other owners alleging that false information had
been given to the state's natural gas regulating commission); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v.
Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25, 30-31 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970)
(commercial competitors seeking to sell products to public agencies under competitive bidding procedures).
51. 365 U.S. at 144. The sham exception has been narrowly interpreted to apply only to
publicity campaigns. Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint Exec.
Bd. of Culinary Workers, 542 F.2d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 940 (1977).
52. 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
53. In considering Trucking Unlimited and Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410
U.S. 366 (1973), the Supreme Court commented that "[t]hose cases together may be cited for
the proposition that repetitive, sham litigation in state courts may constitute an antitrust
violation and that an injunction may lie to enjoin future state-court litigation." Vendo Co.
v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 635 n.6 (1977).
The Ninth Circuit has held "that in order to state a claim for relief under the Trucking
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Court, began his discussion with a brief statement of the governing

principles of Noerr, and re-emphasized the policy argument that it
would be destructive of the rights of association and petition "to hold
that groups with common interests may not, without violating the antitrust laws, use the channels and procedures of state and federal agencies and courts to advocate their causes and points of view respecting
resolution of their business and economic interests vis-a-vis their com-

petitors."54
Factual distinctions between Noerr and Trucking Unlimited, how-

ever, led the Court to conclude that the immunity granted political activity in the antitrust context is limited. Unlike Noerr, in which private
concerted activity to influence public officials was shielded from the
Sherman Act, the private conspirators in Trucking Unlimited "sought to

bar their competitors from meaningful access to adjudicatory tribunals
and so to usurp that decisionmaking process."5 5 The Court noted that
there are "many. . . forms of illegal and reprehensible practice which

may corrupt the administrative or judicial processes and which may
result in antitrust violations."56 Examples include conspiracy with a
licensing authority to eliminate a competitor57 and bribery of a public
purchasing agent.5 8
Justice Douglas emphasized that the first amendment cannot be
Unlimited exception, a complaint must include allegations of the specific activities, not protected by Noerr,which plaintiffs contend have barred their access to a governmental body."
Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint Exec. Bd. of Culinary Workers, 542 F.2d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 940 (1977). The
Eighth Circuit noted the expansive nature of the sham exception in Mark Aero, Inc. v. TWA,
Inc., 580 F.2d 288, 295-96 n.28 (8th Cir. 1978) (" '[c]onstruing the sham exception as enunciated in Noerr to include all activity not genuinely designed to influence the government is
more consonant with the Court's central ruling"' (quoting Fishel, Antitrust LiabilityforAttempts To Influence Government Action: The Basis and Limits of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 80, 105 (1977)). See generaly Oppenheim, Antitrust Immunityfor
Joint Efforts To Influence Adudication Be/ore Administration Agencies and Courts-From
Noerr-Pennington to Trucking Unlimited, 29 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 209 (1972); Note, California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited: A New Route For Noerr-Pennington
and the Sham Exception, 26 Sw. L.J. 926 (1972); Note, The Quagmire Thickens.- A PostCalifornia Motor View of the Antitrust and ConstitutionalRamifications of Petitioningthe
Government, 42 U. CIN. L. REv. 281 (1973); Comment, Trucking Unlimited v. California
Motor Transport: Determining the Noerr Route, 1971 UTAH L. REV. 259 (1971).
54. 404 U.S. at 510-11.
55. Id. at 512.
56. Id. at 513.
57. Id. (citing Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 707
(1962); Harman v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 339 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1964)).
58. Id. at 513 (citing Rangen, Inc. v. Sterling Nelson & Sons, 351 F.2d 851 (9th Cir.
1965)).
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used to immunize conduct that violates a valid statute. 59 Such an interpretation of first amendment guarantees would make it "practically impossible" to enforce the antitrust laws and prosecute other unlawful
conspiracies." ° In affirming the court of appeals decision, the Supreme
Court said that "First Amendment fights may not be used as the means
of the pretext for achieving 'substantive evils'. . . which the legislature
has the power to control."6 1 Thus, the shield of the first amendment
may not be used as a sword to destroy a competitor by preventing or
obstructing his access to administrative agencies and courts.
The Court in Trucking Unlimited concluded that the defendants
had formed "[a] combination of entrepreneurs to harass and deter their
competitors from having 'free and unlimited access' to the agencies and
courts, to defeat that fight by massive, concerted, and purposeful activities."6 2 The Court held that the defendants'
conduct came "within the
'sham' exception to the Noerr case."'6 3
The Eighth Circuit recently considered and rejected an application
of the sham exception in Mark Aero, Inc. v. TWA, Inc.64 In that case
Mark Aero, a chartered air taxi operator, brought an action alleging an
antitrust violation by TWA for its opposition to the reopening of an old
airport. Mark Aero desired to start a new air passenger service between
Kansas City and St. Louis. Mark Aero argued that TWA and Frontier
Airlines had acted to prevent "'free and meaningful access' to the organs of the City government" and thus their conduct came within the
sham exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.6 5 The court stated
that the "fundamental question presented in each case involving the
'sham' exception. . . is the question of intent."6 6 To determine intent,
all factors in the case must be considered to decide whether there existed "true intent to injure competitors directly rather than to influence
governmental action."67 The court concluded that the defendants had
not intended to injure their competitors directly but, rather, had engaged in genuine political activity, and thus there was no basis for applying the sham exception.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 514 (citing Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949)).
Id. (also citing Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945)).
Id. at 515.
Id.
Id. at 516.
580 F.2d 288 (8th Cir. 1978).
Id. at 297.
Id.
Id.
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Recent Application of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine

Several recent decisions clarify the far reaching effects of NoerrPennington in the context of "political boycotts,"6 8 the first of which is
Metro Cable Co. v. CATV,Inc.69 Metro was unable to obtain a
franchise from the City of Rockford, Illinois to construct and operate a
cable television transmission system within that city. Metro brought
suit against CATV of Rockford, a competitor who had been successful
in obtaining an exclusive franchise and had sought to influence the city
council to deny Metro's application for a franchise. The trial court dismissed the suit. In affirming, the Seventh Circuit stated that CATV's
concerted efforts to induce governmental actions were not subject to the
Sherman Act,
even though those efforts had the anticompetitive purpose and
effect alleged by plaintiff [Metro], if those efforts were genuinely aimed at inducing the governmental actions and were
not a pretext for inflicting on plaintiff an injury not caused by
any governmental action. Unlike the injury to plaintiffs in
Trucking Unlimited, the injury to plaintiff in the case at bar
was caused by the governmental actions of the city council
which the defendants genuinely and successfully attempted to
induce the city council to take.7 0
In FranchiseRealty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint
Executive Board of Culinary Workers,7" Franchise Realty (McDonald's) sought permits from the City of San Francisco for the construction of additional McDonald's restaurants. McDonald's brought an
action against two restaurant associations and a labor union, alleging
that they had violated the Sherman Act by opposing the granting of
building permits by the San Francisco Board of Permit Appeals. The
district court dismissed McDonald's first amended complaint with
prejudice. On appeal the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that under
Noerr and Pennington the defendants' activities were absolutely im68. In addition to the recent political boycott cases discussed herein, see Israel v. Baxter
Labs., Inc., 466 F.2d 272 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Noerr-Pennington exemption held applicable
when drug manufacturer alleged that there existed a conspiracy to influence the Food and
Drug Administration in its consideration of new drug applications); Marjorie Webster Jr.
College v. Middle States Ass'n, 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970)
(the Sherman Act is inapplicable in the context of noncommercial liberal arts and learned
professions when there is an incidental restraint of trade, unless there is an intent or purpose
to affect the commercial aspects of the profession).
69. 516 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1975).
70. Id. at 229.
71. 542 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 940 (1977).
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mune from antitrust liability.72
The court also rejected McDonald's claim that the defendants'
73
conduct was analogous to that prohibited in Trucking Unlimited.
While McDonald's alleges, as did the plaintiffs in Trucking
Unlimited,that the purpose and effect of the defendants' opposition is "to foreclose the Company from free and unlimited access" to administrative agencies, its complaint is unlike
that in Trucking Unlimited in that it fails to allege any means
by which defendants have achieved, or plan to achieve, their
alleged goal of barring McDonald's from access to the
Board.7 4
The defendants' activities were within the "direct lobbying immunity
recognized by Noerr, Pennington and Trucking Unlimited itself."75 The
Ninth Circuit went on to state that "in order to state a claim for relief
under the Trucking Unlimited exception, a complaint must include allegations of specific activities, not protected by Noerr, which plaintiffs
contend have barred their access to a governmental body."7 6
In Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammed,7 7 the
Feminist Women's Health Center brought an action for injunctive relief against several doctors in Tallahassee, Florida. The Center
charged the doctors with violations of both federal and state antitrust
laws for allegedly conspiring to boycott the Center's Tallahassee abortion clinic, fixing prices for abortions in the Tallahassee area, and
monopolizing the local market providing women's health and abortion
services. The trial court held that the defendant doctors' various letters
and communications to the State Board of Medical Examiners and to
private peer group review organizations were petitioning activities protected by the first amendment.
Following summary judgment against the antitrust claims on the
basis of the Noerr-Pennington political activities exemption,7 8 the
Center appealed. The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that only the letter of complaint to the executive director of the State Board of Medical
Examiners was protected by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.7 9 Other
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
See text accompanying notes 52-63 supra.
542 F.2d at 1081.
Id.
Id. at 1082.
586 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 262 (1979).
415 F. Supp. 1258, 1268-69 (N.D. Fla. 1976).
586 F.2d at 542.
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communications were held as a matter of law to be unprotected. 8°
In Subscription Television, Inc. v. Southern CaliforniaTheatre Owners Ass'n,8 the Ninth Circuit refused to apply the sham exception.
Subscription Television was in the business of providing pay television
over commercial telephone lines and announced its intention to begin
operations in Los Angeles and San Francisco. California theatre owners organized to oppose this competitive threat by seeking enactment of
legislation through California's initiative process. An initiative, Proposition 15, was drafted and passed in the 1964 general election. The
California Supreme Court subsequently held the measure to be an un82
constitutional infringement of freedom of speech.
Subscription Television commenced an action alleging a conspiracy to restrain trade in violation of the Sherman Act. On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of a directed verdict for
defendants on the basis of the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine. Subscription
Television argued that the theatre owners' activities were a sham and
that they knew that the initiative was unconstitutional from the very
beginning. In rejecting these arguments, the court held that the "theatre owners' activities were not a sham because they were actually seeking and did obtain the desired legislative action."8 " Subscription
Television also contended that "the Noerr-Pennington immunity does
not apply where the political action sought is illegal or unconstitutional."8 4 The Ninth Circuit answered that the "Noerr-Penningtondoctrine is based on the first amendment right of petition and such a right
would be considerably chilled by a rule which would require an advocate to predict whether the desired legislation would withstand a constitutional challenge in the courts."85 The court in Subscription Television
quoted its earlier language in FranchiseRealty:86 "'We know of no
case that holds that joint action which succeeds in persuading a public
body to make an erroneous decision can give rise to a cause of action

under the Sherman Act.'

"87

Thus, what exists today is a political activities exemption from lia80. Id
81. 576 F.2d 230 (9th Cir. 1978).
82. Weaver v. Jordan, 64 Cal. 2d 235, 411 P.2d 289, 49 Cal. Rptr. 537, cerl. denied, 385
U.S. 844 (1966).
83. 576 F.2d at 233.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See text accompanying notes 71-76 supra.
87. 576 F.2d at 234 (quoting Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local
Exec. Bd. of Culinary Workers, 542 F.2d at 1079 n.2).
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bility under the Sherman Act that immunizes concerted efforts to influence government action and policy. The limit to immunity under the
political activities exemption of Noerr and Pennington is reached when,
as in Trucking Unlimited, the conspirators seek not merely "'to influence public officials,' but . . . [also] to bar their competitors from
meaningful access to adjudicating tribunals and so to usurp that decisionmaking process."88 In light of section one of the Sherman Act, the
political activities exemption, and the sham exception to the political
activities exemption, this article now turns to and analyzes a new factual setting that raises the issue of liability under the Sherman Act for
concerted action to effectuate politically motivated economic boycotts.
IV.

CONVENTION BOYCOTTS: LIABILITY UNDER
THE SHERMAN ACT?

A.

Facts of Missouri v. NOW

In March 1972, the proposed Equal Rights Amendment to the
Constitution was submitted to the states for ratification. To date,
thirty-five states have ratified the ERA, three short of the thirty-eight
required for adoption as a constitutional amendment.8 9 As the proponents of the ERA neared their goal, the National Organization for Women intensified its lobbying effort in those states in which ratification
had not yet occurred.9" As early as 1975, the tactic of encouraging national organizations to cancel their conventions scheduled for states
that had not ratified the ERA had been initiated by groups other than
NOW. 9 1 It was believed that convention boycotts of those states would
provide the economic coercion necessary to convince state legislators to
support passage of the ERA.
NOW formulated and adopted, in February 1977, its own resolution advocating convention boycotts.9 2 NOW's convention boycott
campaign was centrally coordinated on a national level from an office
88. 404 U.S. at 512.
89. U.S. CONST. art. V.
90. Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Utah, and Virginia.
91. The National Federation of Business and Professional Women, the National Association of Women Deans, Administrators and Counselors, the League of Women Voters, and
the American Political Science Association were among groups that adopted in 1975 resolutions to hold conventions only in states that had ratified the ERA. No evidence was found
that any of these groups had been contacted or influenced by NOW. In fact, the national
NOW organization was not involved with the boycott movement until 1977, when NOW
became involved with efforts to secure ratification of the ERA in Nevada. Missouri v.
NOW, 467 F. Supp. at 291-92.
92. Id. at 292.
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in Washington, D.C. and involved a three-pronged approach to solicit
support. The first prong was information dissemination: it included letter mailings with follow-up phone calls, boycott brochures with business reply cards, campaign-style buttons, boycott kits, a nationwide
telephone campaign, and meetings with public and private groups, local civic leaders, and state and federal political leaders. 93 The second
prong of the NOW campaign was information gathering,which consisted of compiling statistics on organizations that had adopted boycott
resolutions94 and the economic impact of convention cancellations or
site changes.95 The third prong involved selling the convention boycott
campaign on a national level through the news media, including press
coverage, press releases concerning the convention boycott campaign,
interviews with NOW leaders to explain the importance of the boycott
campaign to the overall plan to secure ratification of the ERA, and
articles urging support of the convention boycott campaign in the Na96
tional NOW Times, an internal publication of NOW.
This three-pronged approach was calculated to secure ERA ratification by enlisting support for NOW's convention boycott campaign
and focusing that support directly on the legislative process. NOW's
convention boycott campaign was motivated by three factors. First was
a desire to employ the boycott as a symbolic gesture, the support of
which meant support for ERA ratification.97 In the words of the district court, "[t]he affirmative step of a boycott resolution or convention
cancellation, urged by NOW and taken by many organizations including NOW, was conceived to show strong support for a political issue,
support of a nature beyond a simple expression of policy or preference."9 The second motivating factor was the necessity for widespread
publicity.9 9 The act of supporting NOW's convention boycott cam-

paign would "attract attention and bring public visibility to the issue of
' ° Finally, with respect to its activities in Missouri,
[ERA] ratification. '""
it was NOW's intent to influence state legislators with the "adverse economic impact of the [convention] boycott on those who would other93. Id. at 293-94.
94. "The NOW list of boycotting organizations dated October 17, 1978, contains 273
organizations and independent decision-making components thereof and 34 city and county
governments." Id. at 297.
95. Id. at 293-94.
96. Id. at 294.
97. Id. at 295.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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'
wise profit from the conventions in Missouri." 10
The State of Missouri, which has not yet ratified the ERA, was
impacted by the boycott campaign in that at least ten major conventions scheduled for Missouri cities were cancelled,10 2 six smaller conventions were moved to facilities in other states, 0 3 and convention
boycott resolutions were adopted that will remain in effect until Missouri ratifies the ERA. Missouri alleged in its complaint that the decisions to cancel conventions and the adoption of convention boycott
resolutions were made "at the express urging" and "in combination
with" NOW.0 4
B. Noerr-Pennington Exemption for the NOWBoycott
In a parens patriae' 0 5 action, Missouri urged that NOW's national
boycott campaign, which adversely affected Missouri's convention industry, was a combination in restraint of trade and thus violated the
Sherman Act. NOW responded that (1) its conduct was outside the
scope of the Sherman Act because of its noncommercial nature, 0 6 (2)
even if NOW was within the scope of the Sherman Act, its conduct was
immunized by the political activities exemption,' 7 and (3) most impor08
tantly, NOW's activities were protected by the first amendment.
The Supreme Court in the Klor's case had stated that the Sherman
"Act is aimed primarily at combinations having commercial objectives
and is applied only to a very limited extent to organizations, like labor
unions, which normally have other objectives."' 0 9 Although NOW's
conduct had commercial impact, its objective was clearly political-the
ratification of the ERA.' o
101. Id.
102. Id. at 296. Cancellations represented an "approximate revenue loss of at least $8.6
million to Missouri hotels, restaurants and numerous other businesses catering to the convention trade." Id. at 297.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 295.
105. The district court considered and approved the parens patriae standing of Missouri
to bring this suit. Id. at 296-301.
106. Id. at 301.
107. Id. at 302-03.
108. Id. at 303.
109. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. at 213 n.7. See also Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940). In Missouri v. NOW, Missouri cited various cases
for the proposition that the Sherman Act does apply to non-traditional boycotts. 467 F.
Supp. at 301 n.25.
110. The district court cited Bird, ShermanAct Limitationson Non-CommericalConcerted
Refusals to Deal, 1970 DUKE L.J. 247, and Coons, NoncommercialPurposeas a Sherman Act
Defense, 56 Nw. L. Rav. 705 (1962), to emphasize the importance of the commercial-non-
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Both Missouri and NOW stipulated that the sole objective of the
convention boycott campaign was the ratification of the ERA."'

NOW and other organizations involved in the national convention
boycott campaign were not motivated by a purpose to impair or destroy

competition in Missouri's convention industry. In fact, neither NOW
nor the convention industry were in any "competitive relationship."" 2
The district court found the boycott to be noncommercial because its

participants were not motivated by business interests and its purpose
was not to increase profits." 3 It found the boycott to be noneconomic
because there was no intention to advance the economic self-interest of

the participants. 4 The court concluded that the "'essential dissimilarity' between the convention boycott directed at the legislatures and
agreements traditionally held violative of § 1 of the Sherman Act is of a

'
greater magnitude in this case than that in Noerr."

15

After finding this essential dissimilarity between NOW's boycott
and more traditional boycotts to which the Sherman Act clearly would
have applied, the district court proceeded in its analysis assuming arguendo that NOW's conduct fell within the scope of the antitrust laws.
The court examined whether NOW's convention boycott campaign
should fall within the immunity of the Noerr-Penninglonpolitical activities exemption from antitrust liability under the Sherman Act."16 Like
commercial distinction. 467 F. Supp. at 304. But see Note, "Political"Blacklisting in the
Motion PictureIndustry. A Sherman Act Violation, 74 YALE L.J. 567, 579-80 (1965), which
was cited by Missouri to rebut the different treatment of noncommercial boycotts and to
urge a per se test of illegality. Brief for Appellant at 29, Missouri v. NOW, No. 79-1379 (8th
Cir. Mar. 28, 1980). See also Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136, 1148-49 (5th Cir. 1977),
in which the Fifth Circuit affirmed per curiam the district court's holding that the NCAA, a
non-profit educational association, is "not entitled to a total exclusion from anti-trust regulations." Id. at 1149. The court in Hennessey cited Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S.
773, 787 (1975), for the proposition that neither the learned professions nor educational
organizations are entitled to a blanket exclusion merely because they are not classic members of the business world. 564 F. Supp. at 1148-49. Cf. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v.
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. at 141 (the proscriptions of the Sherman Act are intended for the business world and are not appropriate in the political arena); Apex Hosiery
Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 493-94 n.5 (1940) (antitrust laws apply to business and commercial transactions); Marjorie Webster Jr. College v. Middle States Ass'n, 432 F.2d 650, 654
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,400 U.S. 965 (1970) (the antitrust laws are designed for use in the
business world, "not for the non-commercial aspects of the liberal arts and the learned professions").
111. 467 F. Supp. at 295.
112. Id. at 304.
113. Id. See also id. at 304 n.28.
114. Id. at 304.
115. Id.
116. See Council for Emp. & Econ. Energy Use v. WHDH Corp., 580 F.2d 9 (1st Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1421 (1979), in which the First Circuit held that the district
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Noerr, in which railroads were seeking stricter government regulation
of the trucking industry, and Pennington, in which the UMW was lobbying before the Secretary of Labor for adjustments to the TVA's wage
and purchasing policies, NOW was engaged in conduct designed to influence governmental action. The Court in Noerr stated that to hold
"that the people cannot freely inform the government of their wishes
would impute to the Sherman Act a purpose to regulate, not business
activity, but political activity, a purpose which would have no basis
whatever in the legislative history of the Act.""' 7
Missouri advanced several arguments why the political activities
exemption should not be applied in this case to immunize NOW's conduct. First, Missouri argued that "NOW's actions have gone far beyond the 'mere solicitation of government action' in Noerr, . . . and
are therefore not within the Noerr 'exclusion' from antitrust coverage.""' Missouri sought to distinguish NOW's conduct from that of
the railroads in Noerr by contending that the restraint of trade flowing
from the convention boycott campaign was a direct result of the combination of NOW and other boycott participants.1 9 Unlike the restraint
of trade in Noerr, which resulted from "a valid legislative act," the restraint of trade in this case was caused by convention boycotts, not by
the passage of the ERA. 2 ° The combination in Noerr sought passage
of legislation that would have restrained trade, whereas in NO W a boycott which itself restrained trade was employed as a vehicle to encourage ratification of the ERA.
Because both Noerr and NOW involve political activity, the question must be asked whether the political activities exemption is intended to immunize conduct that directly restrains trade or is intended
merely to immunize political activity that influences the passage or enforcement of laws which have the incidental effect of restraining trade.
court had properly dismissed a private antitrust action brought by a political committee
against four radio station operators. The political committee alleged that the broadcasters
had violated the Sherman Act by agreeing on the amount of free advertising they would
provide to the opponents of the political committee. The political committee argued that the
defendants' activities denied it free and unlimited access to government agencies and the
political process. The court dismissed the political committee's contentions and held that the
Noerr-Penningtondoctrine insulated the defendants' activities from the scope of the antitrust
laws. Id. at 12-13. See California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. at
513-14 (first amendment rights not immunized from regulation when used to violate antitrust laws).
117. 365 U.S. at 137.
118. 467 F. Supp. at 303.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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This issue is muddied by language of the Court in Noerr that some
"direct injury upon the interests of the party against whom the campaign is directed" is inevitable and does not affect application of the
political activities exemption.12' Although this language is tempting, it
does not resolve the issue of whether the conduct may itself directly
restrain trade. Both the district court and the Eighth Circuit failed to
address this distinction in NOW and thus, by implication, concluded
that the political activities exemption immunizes conduct which itself
directly restrains trade-an interpretation that is a significant departure
from and extension of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.
Missouri's second argument was predicated on the "presumption
against implied exclusions from the Sherman Act."' 22 The district
court answered that the political activities exemption has "been held
sufficiently weighty to overcome this presumption"' 2 3 against implied
exemptions.
Finally, Missouri contended that "a general 'first amendment exclusion' from Sherman Act coverage"' 124 should not apply to exempt
NOW's conduct in this action. Without discussion, the district court
rejected this argument, stating that Missouri's case authority for limiting application of the first amendment did "not touch the issue in this
case, which is whether NOW's actions, which are themselves an exercise of first amendment rights, constitute a violation of the Sherman
25
Act."
When it held that the Sherman Act was inapplicable to NOW's
convention boycott campaign, the court made passing reference to the
first amendment freedoms of petition and association and to the potential constitutional deprivations that could flow from holding NOW liable for antitrust violations. The district court concluded its analysis by
stating that "[t]he Supreme Court's reasons for nonapplication of the
antitrust laws in Noerr apply with greater weight to this case, 'which
involves political opponents, not commercial competitors; and political
objectives, not market place goals.' ,,126
121. 365 U.S. at 143.
122. 467 F. Supp. at 303.
123. Id. (citing City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978)).
124. 467 F. Supp. at 303.
125. Id. at 304. See also id. at 304 n.26 in which the district court briefly discussed the
case cited by Missouri, viz., Council of Defense v. International Magazine Co., 267 F. 390
(8th Cir. 1920).
126. 467 F. Supp. at 305 (quoting Council for Employment & Economic Energy Use v.
WHDH Corp., 580 F.2d 9, 12 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 945 (1979)). Bu see
Webb v. Utah Tour Brokers Ass'n, 568 F.2d 670 (10th Cir. 1977), in which the Tenth Circuit
held that concerted actions by tour brokers, licensed by the ICC, amounted to a boycott of

MISSOURI V NOW

19791

V.

EIGHTH CIRCUIT REVIEW OF MISSOURI V

NOW

On appeal, Missouri's principal contentions were that the district
court had erred both in its application of Noerr and in its analysis of
the first amendment issues. Missouri argued that the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine immunizes only political activity that incidentally and lawfully restrains trade, not conduct that directly restrains trade. Under
this interpretation, NOW's convention boycott campaign would arguably be immune as a political activity, while the convention boycott itself, a product of the concerted activity, 127 and NOW, a participant in
the combination, would be vulnerable to the sanctions of the Sherman
1 28
Act. Although the district court's opinion observed this distinction,
the court failed to analyze it and did not adequately divulge the reasoning for applying the political activities exemption to NOW's boycott of
the Missouri convention industry.
Until now, the Noerr-Penninglon doctrine had only immunized
political activity advocating conduct which itself lawfully restrained
trade. In both Noerr and Pennington the political activity was immune
from application of the Sherman Act because the restraint of trade resulted from government enforcement of valid laws. In NOW, the court
extended immunity to conduct that is itself unlawful under the Sherman Act. Query: If the players were changed and the parties advocating the convention boycott were in the convention industry, would not
such conduct violate the Sherman Act? Would not this be unlawful
sole motivation and purpose were ratification
even if the competitors'
29
ERA?'1
of the
The political activities exemption does not grant absolute immunity from antitrust liability. As previously discussed, 30 the Court in
new applicants for licenses and was thus covered by the per ie rule of the "boycott cases
rather than the exemption decisions in Noerr Motor Freight,Inc. and its progeny." As in
NOW, the defendants in Webb intended and succeeded in bringing about a boycott of
plaintiffs that reduced competition and caused a substantial monetary loss. Unlike NOW,

the parties in Webb were competitors. Even with this dissimilarity, however, it is important
to note the rationale in Webb. Supporting the holding that the defendants were not protected by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine was the fact that "the activities of the defendants
went far beyond the use of legal procedures" in order to achieve their goals. Id. at 676.
Compare this with NOW's encouragement of third parties to boycott Missouri's convention
industry.
127. 467 F. Supp. at 296.

128. Id. at 303.
129. An inherent weakness in this hypothetical is that if the party advocating the convention boycotts were in the convention industry, a commercial setting and a competitive relationship would exist. The Supreme Court discusses and sets out the basic facts of this
hypothetical in Noerr. 365 U.S. at 142.
130. See text accompanying note 51 supra.
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Noerr defined a sham exception that vitiates immunity under the political activities exemption. Further evidence of the conditional nature of
antitrust immunity when political conduct is involved can be found in
the Court's analytical approach in Noerr when determining whether
there were additional factors 13 that justified denying the railroads the
benefit of the political activities exemption. The Court in Noerr indicated that had the trade restraint resulted not from government action
but instead from the railroads' inducing third parties not to deal with
the truckers the principles announced by the Court would have been
inapplicable. 132 Simply stated, had the railroads advocated boycotts of
the trucking industry, the railroads would have been liable for antitrust
violations under the Sherman Act. Is that not precisely the situation in
NO W? Analogizing NO W to this discussion by the Supreme Court in
Noerr, should not NOW be liable under the Sherman Act for its concerted activity to induce third parties to boycott Missouri's convention
industry? NOW's conduct was immune under the Noerr-Renninglon
doctrine only as long as its "activities comprised [a] mere solicitation of
governmental action."' 33 The convention boycott, itself unlawful conduct under the Sherman Act, vitiated the immunity of the political activities exemption, and thus it is arguable that NOW34should have been
held liable under section one of the Sherman Act.'
The strongest argument for not enjoining NOW's conduct lies not
in the Noerr exemption from the Sherman Act but in the first amendment to the United States Constitution. The district court in NOW
alluded to the importance of the first amendment but failed to discuss
adequately why it was central to its holding. Rather, the district court
in conclusory fashion stated that "[a]pplication of the Sherman Act to
NOW's boycott campaign

. . .

would involve serious questions con-

cerning the right of petition and the freedom of association."' 3 5 In its
brief on appeal, NOW clarified and emphasized the "serious quesin the first amendment that were posited by the district
tions" grounded
36
court. 1

131. 365 U.S. at 138. The factors examined by the Court included the railroads' anticompetitive purpose and its use of the so-called third party technique. Id. at 138-42.
132. Id. at 142.
133. Id. at 138.
134. The Ninth Circuit has held that the Noerr-Penninglondoctrine is inapplicable when
illegal means are employed to influence governmental action. Sacramento Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Chauffeurs Local No. 150, 440 F.2d 1096, 1099 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 404 U.S.
826 (1971) (union officials influenced State Fair officials by means of threats, intimidation,
and other coercive measures).
135. 467 F. Supp. at 304.
136. Brief for Appellee at 18-24, Missouri v. NOW, No. 79-1379 (8th Cir. Mar. 28, 1980).
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In affirming the district court's decision, the Eighth Circuit relied
on the "broad-brush" principles set forth in Noerr. The court admitted
that its decision was not based on the noncommercial and
noneconomic aspect of the convention boycott but, rather, on the "right
to use political activities to petition the government."'137 Unfortunately,
the majority failed to resolve adequately the complex issues presented
by the first amendment.' 38 Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit failed to
consider the factual distinctions between Noerr and NOW. As pointed
out by the dissent, such distinctions mandated that the court "undertake a more comprehensive balancing of the important governmental
of peointerest in preserving the free enterprise system with the interest
' ' 39
ple to use this particular method of influencing legislation.'
VI.

CONCLUSION

The district court in Missouri v. NOW based its decision on three
factors: first, the antitrust laws were inapplicable to the convention
boycott campaign due to its noncommercial nature; second, assuming
application of the Sherman Act, NOW's convention boycott was essentially political conduct and as such was immunized under the NoerrPennington doctrine; and finally, NOW's conduct was protected by the
first amendment.
In affirming, the Eighth Circuit held that "using a boycott in a
noncompetitive political arena for the purpose of influencing legislation is not proscribed by the Sherman Act."' 4 ° Thus, the principles of
Noerr control and the Sherman Act applies solely to commercial and
not social or political activity. Chief Judge Gibson 14 stated in his dissent that "this is an over-broad interpretation of the Noerr case and
ignores the basic factual difference between Noerr and the present situation of an economic boycott."' 42 The majority would answer that the
distinctions between Noerr and NOW are not proper areas of concern;
rather, one must examine legislative intent to determine the scope of
the Sherman Act.
That the Sherman Act is not generally applied when the combination does not have commercial objectives is clear. There are, however,
137. No. 79-1379, slip op. at 30 n.16 (8th Cir. Mar. 28, 1980).
138. See id., slip op. at 36-38; Note, PoliticalBoycott Activity andthe FirstAmendment, 91
HARV. L. REV. 630 (1978).
139. No. 79-1379, slip op. at 49 (Gibson, C.J., dissenting).
140. Id., slip op. at 30.
141. The Honorable Floyd R. Gibson was Chief Judge of the Eighth Circuit at the time
Missouri v. NOW was submitted and took senior status before the opinion was filed.
142. No. 79-1379, slip op. at 40 (Gibson, C.J., dissenting).
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exceptions to this principle when the commercial impact of the combination is so great that it warrants antitrust liability. 14 3 The direct commercial injury to Missouri's convention industry is beyond question.
Thus the district court and court of appeals should have asked whether
this was a situation in which section one of the Sherman Act was applicable, even though the activity involved was noncommercial, for it was
in fact a political activity.
Although the Noerr-Pennington doctrine provides immunity for
political activity that restrains trade, that immunity is not absolute.
NOW openly advocated that third parties should boycott Missouri's
convention industry. While NOW's convention boycott campaign itself is political activity and is thus immune from antitrust liability, it
may be argued that the group boycott of Missouri's convention industry vitiated any immunity available to NOW or other participants in
the combination.
The decision of Missouri v. NOW has far-reaching implications for
other politically motivated lobbying organizations. Not only has the
importance of the Noerr-Penninglon doctrine been underscored, but the
underlying policy rationale of the first amendment which provides the
foundation for that doctrine has been strengthened. While the dissent's
suggestion that a balancing analysis be applied to the first amendment
issues raised in NOW'" is far-sighted and probably the better approach to determine Sherman Act liability, such a rule will have to be
mandated by the United States Supreme Court.

143. See Bird, Sherman Act Limitationson Non-Commercial ConcertedRefusals To Deal,
1970 DUKE L.J. 247, in which the author argues that noncommercial boycotts should be per
se violations under the Sherman Act. Id. at 275. The district court specifically addressed
and rejected the theory proposed by Bird, in part because it failed to demonstrate how a per
se rule is consistent with the first amendment guarantees of freedom of association and the
right of petition. 467 F. Supp. at 305 n.32.
144. No. 79-1379, slip op. at 43, 50-53 (Gibson, C.J., dissenting).

